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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
---------------------------------------
NANETTE DIXON, VAL HUMPHERYS, 
and CARRIE HUMPHERYS, 
vs. 
Plaintiffs-
Appellants, 
WILLIAM STODDARD and DARLENE 
STODDARD, 
Defendants-
Respondents. 
Case No. 16876 
BRIEF OF THE DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action by the heirs of Glen s. Humphreys to 
enforce a Promissory Note. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried before a jury which found that there 
had been a material and fraudulent alteration of the 
Promissory Note. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek an order reversing the Judgment in the 
District Court and entering Judgment for the Plaintiff for 
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the unpaid balance on the Note plus interest and costs, or, 
in the alternative, a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
William and Darlene Stoddard own a drugstore in Brigham 
City. In 1967, they agreed to buy the prescription items and 
other saleable inventory from the drugstore owned by Glen s. 
Humphreys, who was retiring. At Mr. Humphreys' request, the 
parties entered into an Agreement (P-3) and Promissory Note 
(R-3) which were drawn up by Mr. Humphreys' attorney. The 
Agreement provided that the value of the saleable inventory was 
to be determined by the Rocky Mountain Wholesale Inventory Crew. 
Defendant William Stoddard testified at trial that there was 
to be a reconciliation of the inventory and the merchandise 
received after the inventory was taken. (T-28) The parties 
also determined that the store inventory would be paid for as 
the items were sold through the Defendants' store. (R-24,25) 
After making payments for several years, the Defendants stopped 
when they found it impossible to sell a major part of the 
inventory received under the Agreement. Plaintiffs sued to 
enforce the Note. Defendants raised as a defense the fact that 
the Promissory Note had been completed without their knowledge 
or authorization since they had never received an inventory as 
per the Agreement. 
2 
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At trial, Defendant William Stoddard was called as an 
adverse witness by the Plaintiff and questioned concerning 
the identity of his signature and the signature of his wife 
on the Promissory Note. (T-26,27) On cross-examination, 
the Defendant was permitted to testify where he was when he 
signed the Note, who was present, and that he and his wife 
signed the Note in blank. The defendants had already admitted 
in their Amended Answer that they had signed the Note in 
blank. (R-42) The Defendants also testified that they had 
never received an inventory as provided in the Agreement 
(R-40) and that some of the heirs had agreed to work out a 
settlement on the unsaleable merchandise. (T-46-48} 
After the Plaintiffs and Defendants rested their cases, the 
trial Judge gave appropriate instructions based on the pleadings 
and evidence. The jury, exercising their prerogative as trier 
of fact, found that there had been a fraudulent and material 
alteration of the P:romissory Note. Plaintiffs moved for a 
Judgment notwithstanding the verdict but were denied their 
motion in a Memorandum Decision. (R-133) 
The Plaintiffs now appeal the verdict of the trial court 
and seek a reversal or, in the alternative, a new trial based 
on some recently discovered evidence. A Motion for a new trial 
based on this new evidence was previously denied by the District 
3 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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Court in a Memorandum Decision. (R-181) 
4 
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A. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE JURY'S VERDICT WAS SUPPORTED BY THE 
EVIDENCE AND SHOULD BE SUSTAINED. 
PLAINTIFFS ARE SUBJECT TO THE DEFENSE OF UNAUTHORIZED 
COMPLETION. 
Since the Plaintiffs acquired the Promissory Note 
"in taking over an estate," they are not holders in due 
course. UCA 70A-3-302 (3) (b) • Therefore, they are subject 
to the defense of unauthorized completion. UCA 70A-3-306. 
Defendant has the burden of establishing that the instrument 
was completed without authorization, UCA 70A-3-115(2) 1 
70A-3-307 and that such a completion consisted of a fraud-
ulent and material alteration under 70A-3-407. Upon meeting 
this burden, the Defendants may be discharged under 
70A-3-407(2) (a) if the contract is changed by the material 
alteration. 
B. THE DEAD MAN STATUTE IS TO BE STRICTLY CONSTRUED. 
In Maxfield v. Sainsbury, 110 Utah 280, 172 P.2d 122 
(1946), the Utah Supreme Court outlined the purpose of the 
dead man statute: 
The purpose of the statute is to guard against 
the temptation to give false testimony in 
regard to a transaction with a deceased person 
5 
I~ . 
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by the surviving party, when the transaction 
is involved in a lawsuit and death has sealed 
the mouth of the other party. Furthermore, 
the statute seeks to put the two parties upon 
terms of equality in regard to giving evidence 
of the transaction •••• It was never intended that 
this section be used for the purpose of suppress-
ing the truth. On the contrary, the statute's 
sole purpose is to prevent the proving by false 
testimony of claims against the estate of a 
deceased person.at 125. 
Since the danger of suppressing truthful testimony is 
so real, the Court requires that the statute be strictly 
construed. Morrison v. Walker Bank and Trust~ 11 Utah 
2d 416, 360 P.2d 1015 (1961). 
The parties have presented themselves before the 
court in an effort to achieve justice. It does not seem 
just that the Defendants' entire case should be swept aside 
because of the unfortuitous demise of one of the parties. 
McKormick's respected treatise on Evidence points out: 
In seeking to avoid injustice to one side, 
the statute-makers have ignored the equal 
possibility of creating injustice to the 
other •••• A searching cross-examination 
will usually, in case of fraud, reveal 
discrepancies in the 'tangled web' of deception. 
In any event, the survivor's disqualification 
is more likely to balk the honest than the 
dishonest survivor. McKormick, Evidence 65 
(2d 2d.1972) 
since the danger of suppressing honest, truthful test-
imony is inherent in this situation, the court's task would 
6 
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appear to be 1) the exercise of a heightened degree of 
scrutiny to determine if §78-24-2 even applies to the 
portions of testimony challenged by Plaintiffs and 2) 
viewing ~efendants' assertions of waiver and harmless 
error in the best possible light. 
C. EVIDENCE THAT THE PROMISSORY NOTE WAS SIGNED IN 
BLANK WAS COMPETENT BECAUSE PLAINTIFFS WAIVED THE 
DEAD MAN STATUTE. 
In this case, the Plaintiff called Defendant William 
Stoddard as an adverse witness to testify regarding the 
identity of the signatures on the Promissory Note. 
(T-26,27) On cross-examination by defense counsel, the 
Defendant testified that he had signed the document in a 
basement apartment, that three other people were present, 
and that he had signed the Promissory Note in blank. 
It is clear from the trial record that Plaintiff was 
the first to inquire into the transaction between the 
Defendants and the decedent. As stata:iin O'Gara v. Findley, 
6 Utah 2d 102, 306 P.2d 1073 (1957): 
He [the Plaintiff] is therefore in no position 
to object when the adverse party explores the 
subject more fully upon cross-examination of 
the witness. In Plain terms the statute does 
not apply when the witness has been called to 
7 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
testify to the transaction by the executor 
of the estate, the adverse party. at 1075 
(emphasis added) 
Therefore,the Plaintiff waived the dead man statute 
as to the testimony regarding signatures in blank, thus 
rendering the testimony competent evidence. 
D. EVEN IF THE TESTIMONY WERE NOT COMPETENT EVIDENCE, 
ITS SUBMISSION TO THE JURY WAS HARMLESS ERROR SINCE 
THE TRIAL JUDGE WAS EMPOWERED TO SUBMIT THE SAME 
INFORMATION TO THE JURY AS A JUDICIAL ADMISSION. 
It is the trial judge's responsibility to instruct 
the jury as to the issues that must be decided in the case 
and the applicable law so that the jury will understand its 
duties. Hanks v. Christensen, 11 Utah 2d 8, 354 P.2d 564 
(1960); Wellman v. Noble, 12 Utah 2d 350, 366 P.2d 701 
(1961). In this case the judge had the authority to 
instruct the jury that the signature of the Promissory Note 
in blank had been admitted in the pleadings and to explain 
its impact on the issue of execution of the Note. It appears 
from the record that the trial judge did in fact make an 
instruction regarding admission of the signature, but this 
presumably refers to the testimony. (R-100) The judge could 
just as well have instructed the jury regarding the admission 
8 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
in the pleadings if the testimony had not been allowed 
in earlier. 
E. FROM THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL, THE JURY WAS 
ENTITLED TO REACH THE VERDICT IT DID. 
It is settled law that a reviewing court will not 
disturb the jury's findings "unless clearly against the 
weight and credibility of the evidence." Bank v. Shivers 
20 Utah 2d 25, 432 P.2d 339,340 (1967): see also Bezner v. 
Continental Dry Cleaner, Inc., 548 P.2d 898 (1967). 
In this case the jury was informed that the Defendants 
signed the Promissory Note in blank and that the amount was 
not to be filled in until after an inventory performed by 
The Rocky Mountain Wholesale Inventory Crew determined the 
value of the store items. Defendant William Stoddard also 
testified that the inventory was to be reconciled with the 
merchandise he received. (T-28) The jury was informed that 
these arrangements were pursuant to the Agreement entered 
into by the parties. No evidence was introduced even as to 
an inventory ever having been performed. Therefore, the jury 
was entitled to believe that the amount and date filled in 
the blank spaces on the Promissory Note were material and 
fraudulent alterations because done without authorization 
and that the Defendant should be discharged from making 
9 
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further payments on the Note. 
Furthermore, the comment made by the jury on the 
verdict suggesting that the Plaintiffs remove the unsale-
able items from the Defendants' basement does not indicate 
confusion on the jury's part. The comment is clearly in 
response to the Defendant's testimony that unsaleable 
items were still in his basement. (T-48) This testimony 
was not objected to and was not excluded. The objections 
and exclusion came when defense counsel sought to introduce 
some of the items into evidence. (T-48) 
F. JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 2 AND SPECIAL VERDICT NO. 1 
WERE CORRECT. 
The court's Instruction No. 2 (R-100) reminded the 
jury of the fact that the Defendants had admitted they 
signed the Promissory Note in blank. As previously pointed 
out, evidence regarding such signatures was competent. 
Therefore, the jury was entitled to rely on it. The remainder 
of the instruction correctly sets forth the law as contained 
in UCA 70 A-3-407 and the common law. 
As to the special verdict, competent evidence regarding 
fraudulent and material alteration of the Promissory Note 
was introduced at trial and the jury was entitled to rely on 
it and find that the Note was altered. Burk v. Peters, 
10 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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though a correct statement of law, does not support 
Plaintiffs' case because 1) the evidence of the signatures 
admitted at trial was also presentable to the jury as a 
judicial admission; 2) in Burk, the Plaintiff was held not 
to have waived the dead man statute. It is Defendants' 
contention on appeal that Plaintiffs waived the dead man 
statute by calling Defendant William Stoddard as an adverse 
witness and questioning him about the transaction that was 
"equally within the knowledge" of the Defendant and decedent. 
POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S DENIAL OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION 
TO SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT AND FOR A NEW TRIAL WAS 
CORRECT. 
A. THE NEW EVIDENCE COULD HAVE BEEN DISCOVERED IN TIME 
TO MOVE FOR A NEW TRIAL IF DUE DILIGENCE HAD BEEN 
EXERCISED. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 60 (b) (2) indicates that the court may 
set aside a judgment if there is "newly discovered evidence 
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in 
time to move for a new trial under 59(b) ." Rule 59(b) 
provides: "A motion for a new trial shall be served not 
later than 10 days after the entry of the judgment." 
In Kettner v. Snow, 13 Utah 2d 382, 375 P.2d 28 (1962), 
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the Utah Supreme court held: 
In order to warrant the granting of a new trial 
on the ground of belatedly discovered evidence, 
relied on by the plaintiffs, it would appear 
both that it 'by due diligence could not.~ave 
been discovered in time to move for a new trial'· I 
and that such evidence was of sufficient substance 
that there would be a resonable likelihood of a 
different result. Otherwise, it is obious that 
the ends of justice would not be served by 
ordering a new trial. at 30 
It has now been almost four years since the complaint bring-
ing this action was filed. In the two years and two months 
that expired between the filing of the complaint and the 
trial, the Plaintiffs have stated they searched for the 
inventory records only three times. (R-159) It seems that 
the due diligence requirement would call for more than one 
search per year for such valuable evidence. Furthermore, 
the fact that the inventory was found among the decedent's 
personal effects indicates that prior efforts to find the 
inventory had not been as thorough and diligent as they 
should have been. In other words, a truly diligent search, 
and surely several truly diligent searches of the decedent's 
personal effects would have turned up this evidence. Had it 
not been for what the Plaintiffs saw as the broad, shield-
like protection of the dead man statute, perhaps a more 
diligent search would have been conducted. 
B. THE NEW EVIDENCE WOULD NOT BRING ABOUT A DIFFERENT RESULT 
i2 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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It is also necessary that there be a IEasonable likelihood 
of a different result because of the newly discovered evidence. 
The learned trial judge indiqated in a Memorandum Decision 
that he did not think the new evidence would change the jury's 
verdict. (R-181) Based on the testimony given at trialp it 
appears that the trial judge was correct. 
Defendant William Stoddard testified that after the 
inventory was taken there was to be a reconciliation and 
that such reconciliation was pursuant to the Agreement. 
(T-28,29) Although a provision for a reconciliation is not 
expressly inoluded in the Agreement, it would be reasonable 
for a jury to assume that the Defendants would desire a 
reconciliation and that Defendant's testimony was merely 
additional evidence of the intent of· the parties. There 
was also conflicting testimony regarding an agreement to 
make a settlement regarding the unsaleable merchandise. 
(T-24, 47-48) A jury could reasonably conclude from this 
that the parties were willing to work outside the terms 
of the Agreement. 
Since there was testimony indicating that the Agreement 
was not the sole embodiment of the intent and wishes of the 
parties, a jury could reasonably conclude that the 
13 
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inventory had to be accepted by the Defendants before 
being included as the sum due on the Pranissory Note. 
Therefore, the likelihood of the new evidence bringing 
about a different result is not sufficient to justify a 
new trial because even though the inventory amount 
corresponds to the ampunt on the Note, it does not prove 
that Defendants authorized the completion of the Note. 
The trial judge did not . abuse his discretion by dismissing 
the motion for a new trial. 
POINT III 
THE JURY'S FINDINGS ON ATTORNEY'S FEES WAS 
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE 
The jury found that there had been a fraudulent and 
material alteration of the Note and th~t the Plaintiffs did 
not have enough evidence to support a verdict in their 
favor. Based on the evidence that led to these findings, 
the jury could reasonably deny Plaintiffs' an award of 
attorney's fees. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondents respectfully submit that the verdict of the 
trial court was supported by competent evide~ c and should be 
upheld on appeal. It is also respectfully submitted that a new 
14 
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-trial based on recently discovered evidence should not be 
granted because the evidence could have been discovered by 
due diligence in time to move for a new trial and will not 
bring about a different result. 
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